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The political economy of bovine tuberculosis in Great Britain 
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r.m.bennett@reading.ac.uk  
Summary 
A brief history of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) and its control in Great Britain is presented. 
Numerous diverse policies to control the disease in man, cattle and wildlife have been 
pursued over the last 100 years and many millions of pounds have been spent. After notable 
success in reducing the incidence and prevalence of bTB in cattle in GB from the 1950s to 
the mid-1980s, the number of cattle slaughtered has increased with increased geographical 
spread continually since that time with a high point of bTB incidence in 2008. This increase 
appeared to coincide with changing policy regarding the control of the disease in badgers 
with a more humane approach adopted and with strengthened protection for badgers through 
legislation. Indeed, much controversy has been involved in the debate on the role of badgers 
in disease transmission to cattle and the need for their control as vectors of the disease with 
various commissioned research projects, trials, public consultations and media attention. The 
findings of two social science investigations presented as examples showed that citizens 
generally believed that bTB in cattle is an important issue that needs to be tackled but 
objected to badgers being killed, whilst cattle farmers were willing to pay around 
£17/animal/year for a bTB cattle vaccine. It is noted that successes regarding the control of 
bTB in other countries have combined both cattle and wildlife controls and had strong 
involvement from industry working with government. 
 
Keywords   Bovine tuberculosis ؎ Control – Policy. 
 
  
2 
 
A brief history of bTB policy in Great Britain 
The fall of bTB in GB 
Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) could be described as the BSE of the late 19
th
 Century
1
 and was 
not identified as a different disease to human tuberculosis until 1882. Following its 
identification, three Royal Commissions were appointed to look into the disease between 
1890 and 1911. However, nothing tangible was done to control bTB until the TB Orders of 
1913/14 which allowed a health authority to slaughter an ‘openly’ affected animal. Numbers 
of cattle slaughtered under these orders increased year by year such that in 1929 some 15,500 
cattle were slaughtered. By the 1930s at least 40% of dairy cattle were thought to be infected 
with bTB 
2
with around 2,500 human deaths per year and much greater numbers of people 
suffering illness (in stark contrast to more recent times when bTB control in cattle has been 
described as ‘irrelevant as a public health policy’)3. A voluntary Attested Herd Scheme and 
milk pasteurisation were introduced in 1935. However, by 1947 only 14% of cattle were in 
attested herds. 
 
In 1950 an area eradication policy was pursued with compulsory testing of cattle, slaughter of 
those that tested positive and government compensation to cattle farmers. In addition, 
pasteurisation became routine and slaughterhouse inspections were increasingly put in place 
to protect public health. By 1960 the whole of GB was attested. The prevalence of bTB in 
cattle fell markedly during this period from some 23,000 cattle slaughtered due to the disease 
in 1935 to a low level in 1960 (data unreliable to give precise numbers of cattle slaughtered). 
 
In 1971 bTB was identified in badgers
4
. The 1973 Badger Act provided protection for 
badgers but the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) could grant licences to 
individuals to kill badgers to prevent disease spread. Over the 1975-82 period gassing of 
badger setts was carried out by MAFF to control the disease (under the Conservation of Wild 
Creatures and Wild Plants Act 1975). The disease and number of cattle slaughtered continued 
to decline until the late 1970s with 1979 recording the lowest prevalence (0.49% of herds 
tested and 0.018% of cattle tested) and then remained at a low level until the mid-1980s when 
it started to rise again, with fewer than a thousand cattle slaughtered in 1980
5
. During this 
time, experiments at the government’s Central Veterinary Laboratories had shown that 
infected badgers can pass infection to cattle
6
. However, in 1980 the Lord Zuckerman review 
responded to concerns that gassing of badgers was inhumane and it was stopped. Instead, 
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from 1982-1985 there was a ‘clean ring’ policy of culling infected badger groups by trapping 
and shooting. 
 
The rise of bTB in GB 
In 1986 there was the Dunnet review which introduced an ‘interim strategy’ which lasted 
until 1997, with badger culling only on farms where bTB was confirmed and where the 
source of infection was badgers. The 1992 Protection of Badgers Act provided additional 
protection for badgers in GB making it an offence to kill, injure, cruelly ill-treat or take a 
badger, or interfere with a sett
7
. By 1996 it was clear that this interim strategy was not 
working with bTB in cattle rising substantially and John Krebs chaired an Independent 
Scientific Review Group which reported at the end of 1997. As a result of this review, the 
Independent Scientific Group (ISG) was set up in 1998 which put in place an extensive 
Random Badger Culling Trial (RBCT). The trial continued for some years with the ISG 
reporting mixed results highlighting area effects and badger perturbation with a reduction in 
bTB incidence in some areas but concluding that badger culling was not thought to be 
economic. 
 
It is worth noting that in 2003 the reactive component of the RBCT was stopped because bTB 
in some areas had increased and it was thought that this was due to badger perturbation as a 
result of culling. Arguably, the decision to cease this element of the RBCT resulted in a loss 
of trial data being available for subsequent analysis. Within the trial period the government 
undertook a review and consultation of bTB policy and in 2005 published the Government 
Strategic Framework for Sustainable Control of bTB in GB, providing a ten year vision 
which aimed to ‘develop a new partnership’ to slow down spread and reduce cattle incidence 
in high incidence areas
8. In 2006, the government introduced new compensation ‘table’ 
values rather than 100% market values for compulsorily slaughtered cattle and introduced 
pre-movement bTB testing of cattle. 
 
Governance and the role of advisory committees 
During this period, GB government used a number of advisory boards to advise on bTB 
strategy and implementation. The TB Forum (a stakeholder group chaired by Defra) operated 
from 1999 to 2006. It was described by an Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select 
Committee
9
 as “an arena for the repetition of entrenched views” with farmers’ representatives 
on one side calling for a cull of badgers and wildlife groups on the other maintaining that 
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badgers were largely not to blame for bTB and that a cull would achieve very little, with a 
Defra official refereeing an often heated and confrontational debate. In 2006, the TB 
Advisory Group (TBAG) was set up. There was also a bTB Husbandry Group (set up in 
2006) and a bTB Science Advisory Board (set up in 2008). The government had also set up 
an England Implementation Group (EIG) for the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy in 2005 
(later disbanded in 2009 and replaced with the Animal Health and Welfare Board for 
England), which largely steered clear of commenting on bTB policy in part fearing that the 
wide remit of EIG could become dominated by the issue. 
 
A high point of bTB incidence was seen in 2008 with 6.4% of herds declared as ‘new culture 
or lesion positive’. In July 2008 the then Defra minister announced that there would be no 
badger cull due to the uncertainty of success (Defra-commissioned research had highlighted 
the costs of badger culling in relation to the possible scenarios of bTB incidence in cattle, 
with some scenarios showing a worsening of bTB due to badger perturbation and others a net 
cost associated with badger culling in relation to the benefits
10
). However, the minister also 
announced a £20M investment in vaccine development (in 2009/10 the Defra Badger Vaccine 
Deployment Project tested a BCG badger vaccine) with the long-term goal of eradicating 
bTB in GB. This goal was re-iterated in the TBAG 2009 report ‘Towards Eradication’11 
which marked a policy change from merely aiming to reduce the incidence and slow the 
spread of bTB in cattle
12
. 
 
At this time, TBAG was disbanded and replaced by the TB Eradication Group (TBEG) which 
in turn (in 2012) was replaced by TBEAG (TB Eradication Advisory Group) for England 
which advised the newly formed Animal Health and Welfare Board for England (AHWBE) 
which was set up in 2011. Wales (and, to some extent, Scotland) had similar devolved bodies. 
 
In 2011, Defra produced a TB eradication program for England which it described as ‘a 
comprehensive and balanced package of measures to tackle TB in cattle, badgers and other 
animals, including the Government’s view that it is strongly minded to allow a science-led 
cull of badgers in the worst affected areas’13. A top priority of the program was to produce a 
cattle vaccine and an oral badger vaccine but recognizing that this would take some years. 
However, a BCG-based injectable badger vaccine had been available for use in GB since 
2010 but with little take up by cattle farmers or others (despite some funding available from 
government).  In 2013, a somewhat controversial pilot cull of badgers was introduced into 
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two pilot areas of England, in west Gloucestershire and west Somerset. Badger and other 
wildlife and animal welfare groups were generally against the trial. The primary aim of these 
trials was to assess the effectiveness, safety and humaneness of culling using ‘free shooting’ 
(i.e. rather than trapping in cages and then shooting). The Welsh Government suspended a 
badger cull programme in 2011 and replaced it with a five year trapping and vaccination 
programme. 
 
Role of the media 
The issue of badger culling has been a sensitive and political one for some decades, arguably 
with the media (especially newspapers) helping to stoke public concerns. Two newspaper 
articles provide good examples of this. The first reports on the government’s consultation on 
badger culling in 2005. This article was in the Independent newspaper (16
th
 December 2005) 
with substantial space given to the story both inside the paper and with virtually the whole of 
the front page dominated by a picture of a badger and a large print headline which read “The 
Culling Fields” and two sub-headings “Mass slaughter plan for badgers provokes outcry” and 
“Animal groups deny that cull will ease TB crisis”. The main headline is an emotive play-on-
words of ‘The Killing Fields’ which is a well-known 1984 film about the Cambodian War in 
the 1970s and Pol Pot’s cleansing campaign which killed 2 million ‘undesirable’ civilians. 
This could be interpreted as suggesting that badger culling is akin to ethnic cleansing. 
 
The second article was in the Guardian’s ‘i’ newspaper (14th September 2013) and reported 
on the pilot badger culls in England referred to previously. Again, the article was 
accompanied by a picture of a badger together with members of an ‘anti-badger cull patrol’ in 
west Somerset. The article was headlined “We heard four shots, a scream, then grunting … 
then silence”. In fact, the headline was taken from a local patrol member who is quoted as 
saying “We heard three or four shots, which lasted three to five seconds, then grunting, then 
silence… I know what death sounds like”. Again, arguably, this is very emotive reporting 
almost entirely from the perspective of protestors against the pilot cull, and with an emotive 
and perhaps anthropomorphic description of badgers ‘screaming’. 
 
The 2005/6 public consultation on badger culling received over 47,000 letters, 10,000 texts 
and 13 petitions with only 4% of people in favour of culling 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/5172360.stm). YouGov polls on badger culling since 
2012 have found more people opposed to a cull than supporting one 
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(httpsi//yougov.co.uk/news/2014/09/11/two-years-badger-cull-remains-unpopular), although 
public opinion appears to have softened somewhat in this regard over the last ten years. 
 
Following public consultation, in April 2014 Defra published its ‘Strategy for achieving 
Officially Bovine Tuberculosis Free status for England’.  The main elements of this are: for 
England to be Officially TB Free (OTF) by 2038 with some parts being OTF by 2025; the 
pursuance of a risk area strategy; culling of badgers in endemic areas and £24.6M for 
development of cattle and badger vaccines - although these are referred to as “still many 
years away”14, although in 2015 cattle vaccine/DIVA field trials are programmed to take 
place. 
 
A key element of this strategy is the ‘edge’ area which is one of three types of defined bTB 
risk area identified in the strategy - ‘high risk area’ (HRA; 0.1% herd prevalence), ‘edge’ (1% 
herd prevalence and increasing) and ‘low risk area’ (LRA; 9% herd prevalence). The ‘edge’ 
is a geographical area at the edge of annual testing areas in England where bTB is not thought 
to be endemic but where infection is either spreading or is at risk of disease spread in the 
short to medium term
15
. Edge areas are subject to ‘enhanced cattle controls’ and annual 
testing. In addition, a voluntary risk-based cattle trading scheme was introduced
16
. 
 
The current situation 
Despite the extensive activities undertaken over the last few decades, in 2015 bTB continues 
to increase its geographic spread in England and Wales without satisfactory resolution, 
although Scotland (with a historically low and stable incidence of bTB) became OTF in 2009. 
Indeed, the costs associated with bTB in GB have increased markedly from an estimated £25 
million in 1998/99
17
 to over £108 million in 2008/9
18
 and likely continue to be in access of 
£100 million per annum today. The number of cattle herds that are not OTF has increased to 
over 8,500 in 2014 (from 5,220 in 2004 and 1589 in 1996) with new herd incidents of over 
4,700.
19
  
 
The bTB debate continues to revolve around a number of ‘thorny’ issues. These include the 
contribution to infection of cattle to cattle spread and badger (and other wildlife) to cattle 
spread, the efficacy of bTB cattle testing, the efficacy of cattle and badger vaccination, the 
acceptability, efficacy and cost of badger culling, the potential of farm biosecurity measures 
to reduce spread, the role of government and partnership working with stakeholders 
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(especially the cattle industry), the polarisation of opinion with often heated, emotive debate 
and apparently conflicting evidence – for example, the ISG’s conclusion that a badger cull 
was too costly and impractical whilst the Select Committee on Agriculture
20
 stated that it 
could have a “significant effect on reducing TB in cattle”. Pfeiffer (2013)21 looks back on the 
previous 20 years of the problem of bTB in GB and concludes that an ‘integrated risk 
governance perspective’ is needed which includes participatory components by stakeholders 
and which takes account of the drivers of human behaviour (the importance of the latter to 
livestock disease control is well highlighted by Olmstead and Rhode, 2015
22
). 
 
Social science research case studies 
This section presents two case-study examples from 22 (published) economic and social 
science studies of bTB in GB identified by a Defra review in 2013
23
. 
 
1. Public attitudes to badgers and bTB in cattle 
A long standing issue in bTB control in GB has been the control of badgers as a source of 
cattle infection. A number of research studies have been commissioned by government to 
assess the role that badger control may play in reducing bTB and stakeholders’ views, 
particularly in relation to badger culling in its various forms (trapping and shooting, gassing, 
‘free’ shooting). A major problem in this regard has been that historically British citizens 
have seen the badger as a much loved wildlife species that they have been exposed to since 
childhood through literature such as ‘The Wind in the Willows’24 and through wildlife groups 
(the badger is the emblem on the logo of the 47 Wildlife Trusts in the UK) and wildlife 
programs on their television screens (e.g. the BBC’s Springwatch programme). 
 
In 2007/8 Defra commissioned a study to assess the value that  people in England and Wales 
give to badger populations in the context of bTB and possible badger culling
25
. The study 
involved a choice experiment (CE) survey of 400 telephone interviews using a stratified 
random sample of households in England and Wales. The interview questionnaire contained 
(i) questions about respondents’ experiences of badgers and their attitudes regarding the 
management of badgers (ii) an information statement about badgers and bTB, an explanation 
of the choice exercise and the choice sets for people to express their preferences (iii) an open-
ended question asking respondents to explain the reasoning behind their choices (iv) a further 
series of attitudinal questions which on respondents’ attitudes to badger management and 
bTB and (v) personal questions about the respondent and their household. The design of the 
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choice experiment involved four attributes (size of the badger population, cattle slaughtered 
due to bTB, badger management strategy and household tax) at four levels with eight choice 
sets of two alternatives presented to respondents (see Table I for the attribute levels and Table 
II for an example choice set). 
 
From the choices made by respondents estimates were derived (using a Conditional Logit 
model) for the trade-offs that people are prepared to make between the various attributes (i.e. 
their ‘value’ in terms of other attributes which include a money payment). 
 
The main findings of the study in terms of citizens’ attitudes to bTB in cattle and control of 
badgers is shown in Figure 1. Ninety-two per cent of people agreed that controlling bTB in 
cattle is important but they were not sure whether this should be done by controlling badger 
populations. Seventy-three percent objected to badgers being intentionally killed but 87% 
thought it acceptable to control badger populations if it could be done without killing whilst 
just over half of people thought that a limited or temporary cull of badgers was acceptable if 
it solved the bTB problem. It was estimated that respondents would be willing to pay a mean 
of £0.10 per household per year for an extra 100,000 badgers in the badger population (within 
population limits of 100,000 to 400,000), £1.52 per household per year for every 10,000 
reduction in cattle slaughtered due to bTB and £68.31 per household per year not to have 
badger culling. 
 
Aggregating these values for England and Wales (21.7 million households) gives a 
willingness to pay per additional badger in the population of £22/year and £3,298 per animal 
for a reduction in cattle slaughtered each year due to bTB. This would value a reduction in 
the badger population from the current 300,000 to 100,000 animals at £4.4 million per year 
and a reduction in cattle slaughtered due to bTB from 24,000 per year to zero at £79 million 
per year. Badger culling would appear to be very important to people with a very high 
aggregate willingness to pay of £1,480 million/year for England and Wales. It is likely that 
people have overstated their willingness to pay wishing to make a ‘protest vote’ because of 
the highly emotive nature of badger culling with strong feelings against it. 
 
2. The value of a bTB cattle vaccine to farmers 
Cattle vaccination is another area of intense debate in relation to bTB control and substantial 
sums of public money have been spent in pursuit of a practical and efficacious cattle vaccine. 
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Defra commissioned a study in 2010/11 to explore farmers’ attitudes towards and willingness 
to pay for a bTB cattle vaccine
26
. The study involved a telephone interview survey of 300 
cattle farmers in annually –tested areas in England and Wales stratified according to whether 
farmers were dairy or beef and whether they had had a bTB breakdown in the previous five 
or ten years or not. 
 
The questionnaire administered to farmers was divided into eight parts: (i) farm information 
(size and type of herd etc.); (ii) information relating to bTB on the farm; (iii) attitudinal 
statements and questions concerning bTB risk, bio-security etc; (iv) an information statement 
about bTB and a possible cattle vaccine; (v) a choice experiment exercise (containing a 
description and explanation of what the respondent should do with eight randomly allocated 
choice sets presented to them); (vi) a contingent valuation question; (vii) an open-ended 
debriefing question (asking respondents to explain the reasoning behind the choices they 
made) and follow-up attitudinal questions relating to their WTP; and (viii) personal details of 
the farmer and the farm family. 
 
The survey used both contingent valuation and choice experiment methods to elicit farmers’ 
willingness to pay for a bTB cattle vaccine with specific attributes. These attributes were: 
vaccine effectiveness in terms of the ability of a vaccine to prevent a farm having a bTB 
breakdown (risk of breakdown); vaccine effectiveness in terms of the ability of a vaccine to 
reduce the severity of a breakdown (i.e. reduction in the number of reactor cattle); the level of 
insurance or ‘loss recovery’ associated with a vaccine where a vaccine fails to prevent a bTB 
breakdown; and the cost per dose per animal of the vaccine. 
 
Table III shows the levels for each attribute and an example of a choice set. The first attribute 
was given four possible levels providing reductions in the probability of a farm having a bTB 
breakdown of 20%, 40%, 60% or 80%. The second attribute was also given four possible 
levels for reducing the severity of a breakdown of 20%, 40%, 60% or 80% (i.e. that the 
number of reactor cattle would be reduced by these percentages). The third attribute – the 
extent to which the farmer was covered by insurance for total losses due to bTB – was given 
five levels of 0%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100%. The fourth attribute – price of the vaccine – 
was given five levels of £5, £10, £15, £20 and £30 (based on likely vaccine prices and pilot 
survey responses). 
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In the contingent valuation question, respondents were provided with a brief scenario of a 
bTB cattle vaccine that was 90% efficacious and backed by a 100% insurance ⁄ loss recovery 
of total losses due to a bTB breakdown. The level of efficacy chosen was thought to be the 
maximum that would be credible to respondents. It was assumed in this case that the vaccine 
had to be administered annually. The CV question asked participants: ‘Would you be willing 
to pay £x per animal per year for such a vaccine?’ Participants were first asked this question 
in relation to either £10 or £15 (chosen randomly). If they answered ‘no’ to this first question 
they were then asked whether they would be willing to pay a lower amount, either £5 or £7, 
respectively. If they answered ‘yes’ to the first question they were then asked whether they 
would be willing to pay a higher amount, either £20 or £30, respectively. Bid levels were 
chosen in the light of likely vaccine costs, focus group discussion of farmers’ willingness to 
pay and bid values elicited in a pilot questionnaire. 
 
Farmers’ WTP for the vaccine attributes were estimated from the CE responses using a 
Bayesian mixed logit model following
27
. Farmers’ WTP for the cattle vaccine specified in the 
double-bounded CV questions were estimated using the interval data estimation approach
28
 
29
 
and using a Bayesian estimation method. 
 
Results showed that 68% of farms had experienced a bTB breakdown. On average, farms 
reporting a bTB breakdown had 2.4 breakdowns in the previous five years, with an average 
of seven reactors in the most recent breakdown. The number of reactors or other animals 
slaughtered ranged from zero to 200. The average length of breakdown experienced by the 
farms was 34 weeks. More than two-thirds (68%) of farms were clear of bTB at the time of 
the survey. Over 96% of farmers agreed that bTB was a major risk for the GB cattle industry, 
61% felt that their farm had a high risk of a bTB breakdown, 39% agreed that biosecurity on 
farms can greatly reduce the risk of bTB (40% disagreed), and over 71% thought there was 
not much that they could do to prevent their cattle getting bTB. Most farmers believed that 
there was a relatively high probability of their herds suffering a bTB breakdown as shown in 
Table IV. Indeed, most farmers felt there was at least a 50% chance of their herd suffering a 
breakdown in any one year which was substantially higher than suggested by breakdown 
statistics in those areas. 
 
Analyses of farmers’ willingness to pay from the CE found that farmers had the highest 
willingness to pay for a vaccine that could reduce the risk of a breakdown, followed by the 
11 
 
provision of loss insurance followed by the ability of a vaccine to reduce the severity of 
disease in terms of the numbers of reactors. Mean willingness to pay for a single-dose 
vaccine of 90% efficacy and backed by 100% insurance was £55 per animal. In contrast, 
mean willingness to pay from the contingent valuation estimate was £17 per animal per year 
for an annual vaccination which offered 90% efficacy and 100% insurance. Both estimates 
had relatively high standard deviations reflecting a large range of willingness to pay 
responses from farmers. Given the average lifespan of cattle, these values are comparable 
which provides some validity of their credibility. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has briefly explored some aspects of the political economy of bTB in GB. It has 
provided a brief historical review, considered the influence of the media, changing 
governance and examples of the social science research related to the ‘bTB problem’. Other 
countries, notably Australia, the USA (Michigan), New Zealand and the Republic of Ireland 
have all had some success in controlling bTB. However, each of these has combined control 
of the disease in wildlife (water buffalo, deer, possum and badger respectively) with control 
of cattle to cattle transmission and with substantial involvement of industry (including cost 
sharing), working in partnership with government. 
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Table I 
Attributes and attribute levels used in the choice experiment  
 
Attribute Attribute levels  
Badger population  100,000, 200,000, 300,000, 400,000 
Management strategy  1: trap and shoot badgers 
2: application of contraceptive to badgers  
3: current policy: badgers remain a protected species  
4: current policy plus provision of badger tunnels under 
roads 
Cattle with TB slaughtered 
per year  
0; 10,000; 20,000; 50,000 
Increase in tax per 
household per year  
£5; £20; £50; £100  
 
Table II 
Example of a choice set * 
 
 Choice set 
A B 
Badger population (GB) 100,000 300,000 
Management strategy Trap and shoot badgers Current policy: badgers 
remain a protected species 
Cattle with bTB** 10,000 cattle/year killed 20,000 cattle/year killed 
Increased tax per household 
per year 
£20 £20 
 
* Respondents must choose their preferred choice set - either A or B. 
** bTB: bovine tuberculosis  
 
Table III 
Example of experiment choice set showing attributes and their levels 
 
Vaccine attributes A B C 
1. Vaccine effectiveness - reduction in the risk of a 
breakdown (20, 40, 60, 80) (%) 
60 80 0 
2. Vaccine effectiveness - reduction in the breakdown 
severity (20, 40, 60, 80) (%) 
80 80 0 
3. Insurance ⁄ loss recovery as % of total financial loss 
from bTB* (0, 40, 60, 80, 100) (%) 
60 100 70 
4. Cost of vaccine dose (£5, £10, £15, £20, £30) £10 £20 £0 
* bTB: bovine tuberculosis 
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Table IV 
Farmers’ perceptions of the risk of their herd testing positive to bovine tuberculosis 
(bTB) in any one year (% of sample in each category) 
 
Likelihood (%) Whole sample bTB breakdown No bTB breakdown 
>50 30.0 38.5 12.1 
50 24.0 24.6 23.1 
33 12.2 12.3 12.1 
20 9.4 10.8 6.6 
10 8.7 5.1 16.5 
5 5.6 3.5 11.0 
<5 10.1 5.6 18.7 
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Fig. 1 
Public attitudes to badgers and bovine tuberculosis (bTB) 
  
Public attitudes to badgers and bTB
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
A limited/temporary killing of badgers acceptable if bTB problem solved
Controlling badgers acceptable if without killing
I object to badgers being intentionally killed
If badger populations are to be managed the government should do it
Farmers/landowners should be licensed to kill badgers where they
cause damage to property or to livestock
bTB in cattle should be controlled by the management of badger
populations
Controlling bTB in cattle is important
Management of wildlife such as badgers sometimes necessary
Can be fewer badgers as long as not endangered species
The larger the badger population the better
Badgers are important wildlife species
Agree
Neither
Disagree
15 
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